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Admissibility of a posterior predictive decision rule
Giri Gopalan∗
Abstract
Recent decades have seen an interest in prediction problems for which Bayesian methodology has been
used ubiquitously. Sampling from or approximating the posterior predictive distribution in a Bayesian
model allows one to make inferential statements about potentially observable random quantities given
observed data. The purpose of this note is to use statistical decision theory as a basis to justify the use
of a posterior predictive distribution for making a point prediction.
1 Introduction and Motivation
As reviewed by [Owhadi and Scovel], the field of statistical decision theory introduced by Wald, building on
a game theoretic foundation developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern, provides links between Bayesian
and frequentist statistical philosophies through the concepts of decision rules, admissibility, and risk functions
amongst others. Moreover, a recent thrust of research motivated by machine learning has put much emphasis
on prediction problems for which Bayesian methodology has been widely used. The purpose of this note
is to demonstrate that classic decision theoretic results can be simply applied to the analysis of prediction
problems. In fact, both [Berger] and [Robert] remark upon the ease of applying statistical decision theory
within the context of prediction, however, no explicit result is stated in either work; the contribution of this
note, therefore, is to highlight a simple way in which the results of statistical decision theory might apply to
prediction problems. To the author’s knowledge the most similar lines of thought appear in work by [Nayak
and El-Baz], where the loss function depends on the underlying parameter (in contrast to what follows).
Additionally, in [Nayak and El-Baz], a proof of admissibility of a Bayesian prediction rule is not given, albeit
alluded to.
In statistical decision theory it is desired that an estimator is admissible, meaning that there exists no
other estimator whose (frequentist) risk is both: i) at least as small for all values of the parameter space and
ii) strictly smaller for at least a single value of the parameter space. In this note, the notion of the risk of an
estimator is extended to the risk of a prediction rule using statistical decision theory, and, furthermore, this
framework is used to evaluate a prediction rule derived by minimizing the Bayes prediction risk, analogously
to a decision rule derived by minimizing the Bayes risk. It is shown that such a rule is admissible and
can be derived by minimizing the (Bayes) posterior predictive risk. These results may motivate the use
of a (Bayesian) posterior predictive distribution to make a prediction, since admissibility is a desirable
property, and minimizing the Bayes posterior predictive risk is computationally tractable in many cases, just
as minimizing the Bayes risk is computationally straightforward under commonly used loss functions. For
instance, the posterior predictive mean is admissible and minimizes the Bayesian prediction risk under a
squared error loss, just as the posterior mean is admissible and minimizes the Bayesian risk under a squared
error loss (under weak conditions).
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2 Definitions and Assumptions
Denote the parameter space Θ ⊆ Rk. Without essential loss of generality, it is assumed all random variables
are continuous and have Lebesgue-integrable density functions; the discrete case can be considered using
the counting measure. Additionally, it is assumed that conditions hold to apply the Fubini theorem (e.g.,
Theorem 2.8 of [Lehmann and Casella]), and the prior distribution is proper, meaning it integrates to unity
and is a valid probability density. Note that the inferential versions of the definitions given below are covered
by many sources, including [Berger], [Robert], and [Wasserman].
Definition(s) 1: Denote the random variable Yobs ∈ R
M for data observed, the random variable Ypred ∈
R
N for data one would like to predict, and θ for an unknown that indexes a data generating process,
f(ypred, yobs|θ), a probability density function f : R
N ×RM → [0,∞). In the Bayesian context, one assumes
that θ ∈ Rk is a random variable and has a prior probability distribution g(θ), g : Rk → [0,∞) ascribed to
it, such that the joint distribution of (Ypred, Yobs, θ) is given by f(ypred, yobs|θ)g(θ). It is further assumed
that g(θ) > 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ. The posterior predictive distribution is the conditional distribution of Ypred given yobs,
p(ypred|yobs), p : R
N × RM → [0,∞).
Definition 2: A prediction rule Yˆ (.) is a function of Yobs meant to make a guess at Ypred, Yˆ : R
M → RN .
This is analogous to a decision rule θˆ that is meant to be a guess of an unknown θ.
Definition 3: A loss function L : RN × RN → [0,∞), L(Yˆ (Yobs), Ypred), penalizes a discrepancy between
Yˆ (Yobs) and Ypred. The frequentist notion of prediction risk of the prediction rule can be considered the
average of L(Yˆ , Ypred) holding θ fixed, just as frequentist risk of an estimator is the average of L(θˆ, θ) holding
θ fixed. The Bayesian prediction risk is the average of L(Yˆ , Ypred) over the joint distribution of (Ypred,
Yobs, θ), just as the Bayes risk is the average of L(θˆ, θ) over the joint distribution of (Yobs, θ). Throughout, it
is assumed frequentist and Bayesian prediction risk are continuous and well defined ∀θ ∈ Θ, Yˆ and Ypred.
Definition 4: A Bayes prediction rule is one which minimizes the Bayesian prediction risk.
Definition 5: A prediction rule Yˆ is admissible if there is no other prediction rule that achieves a frequentist
prediction risk that is both: i) at least as small as that of Yˆ ∀θ ∈ Θ and ii) strictly smaller than that of Yˆ ,
for at least a single value of θ ∈ Θ.
3 Theorems
Theorem 1: Under the assumptions of section 2, a Bayes prediction rule can be found by minimizing the
average of L(Yˆ (Yobs), Ypred) over p(ypred|yobs), referred to as the posterior predictive risk.
Proof: The Bayes prediction risk is the average of L(Yˆ (Yobs), Ypred) over the joint distribution of (Yobs, Ypred),
since L(Yˆ (Yobs), Ypred) is not a function of θ, and so θ can be integrated (or summed) out of the joint distri-
bution of (Yobs, Ypred, θ). Furthermore, the distribution of (Yobs, Ypred) can be written as p(ypred|yobs)p(yobs)
(overloading the p(.) notation for less clutter), so to minimize the Bayes prediction risk it suffices to minimize
the average of L(Yˆ (Yobs), Ypred) over p(ypred|yobs) for arbitrary yobs. In other words, the standard argument
for deriving a Bayes rule can be applied by integrating out θ as a nuisance parameter.
To make this argument more explicit, mathematical notation is introduced, overloading the p(.) notation
to indicate probability densities. A Bayesian prediction rule is derived by minimizing the Bayesian prediction
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risk:∫ ∫ ∫
L(yˆ(yobs), ypred)p(ypred, yobs, θ)dθdypreddyobs =
∫ ∫
L(yˆ(yobs), ypred)
∫
p(ypred, yobs, θ)dθdypreddyobs
=
∫ ∫
L(yˆ(yobs), ypred)p(ypred, yobs)dypreddyobs
=
∫ ∫
L(yˆ(yobs), ypred)p(ypred|yobs)p(yobs)dypreddyobs
=
∫ ∫
L(yˆ(yobs), ypred)p(ypred|yobs)dypredp(yobs)dyobs
Which can be minimized by minimizing
∫
L(yˆ(yobs), ypred)p(ypred|yobs)dypred for arbitrary yobs, i.e., the
posterior predictive risk.
Theorem 2: Under the assumptions of section 2, Bayesian prediction rules are admissible.
Proof: Assume there is a Bayesian prediction rule YˆBayes that is not admissible, so that there exists another
prediction rule Yˆnew which achieves a strictly smaller frequentist prediction risk for some value θ∗ ∈ Θ, and
at least as small frequentist prediction risk for all other values in Θ. Since frequentist risk is assumed to be
continuous, there is some measurable subset of S of Rk containing θ∗ such that the frequentist risk of Yˆnew
is strictly smaller than that of YˆBayes on this subset. In other words ∀θ ∈ S:
∫ ∫
L(yˆnew, ypred)f(ypred, yobs|θ)dypreddyobs <
∫ ∫
L(yˆBayes, ypred)f(ypred, yobs|θ)dypreddyobs
and ∀θ ∈ Sc:
∫ ∫
L(yˆnew, ypred)f(ypred, yobs|θ)dypreddyobs ≤
∫ ∫
L(yˆBayes, ypred)f(ypred, yobs|θ)dypreddyobs
Since the Bayesian prediction risk is the average of the frequentist risk over θ, and the prior g(θ) is strictly
non-zero for all points in Θ (including those points for which the frequentist risk of Yˆnew is strictly smaller
than that of YˆBayes), this yields a prediction rule with strictly smaller Bayesian prediction risk, which is a
contradiction. In other words, the previous inequalities imply:
∫
S
∫ ∫
L(yˆnew, ypred)f(ypred, yobs|θ)g(θ)dypreddyobsdθ <
∫
S
∫ ∫
L(yˆBayes, ypred)f(ypred, yobs|θ)g(θ)dypreddyobsdθ
and:∫
Sc
∫ ∫
L(yˆnew, ypred)f(ypred, yobs|θ)g(θ)dypreddyobsdθ ≤
∫
Sc
∫ ∫
L(yˆBayes, ypred)f(ypred, yobs|θ)g(θ)dypreddyobsdθ
so:∫ ∫ ∫
L(yˆnew, ypred)f(ypred, yobs|θ)g(θ)dypreddyobsdθ <
∫ ∫ ∫
L(yˆBayes, ypred)f(ypred, yobs|θ)g(θ)dypreddyobsdθ
which contradicts that YˆBayes is a Bayes rule.
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4 Discussion
The contribution of this note has been to show that two results of statistical decision theory can be extended
to a prediction setting with natural modifications to standard textbook definitions. Namely, the loss function
allows both arguments to be random as opposed to one fixed and one random, and the underlying “true”
state of nature θ is treated as a nuisance parameter when deriving a Bayes rule.
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